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Abstract 
Election Cycles in MPs’ Outside Interests?  
The UK House of Commons, 2005-2010 
Benny Geys* 
Politicians often implement popular changes in public policies prior to elections, with the 
aim of improving their Election Day outcome. This research note evaluates whether such 
‘electioneering’ carries over also into politicians’ extra-parliamentary activities. Evidence 
from the UK House of Commons over the period 2005-2010 suggests adjustments do occur 
in MPs’ outside activities over the election cycle. The safety of the politicians’ seat and 
his/her decision to stand for re-election play an important mediating role. 
Keywords: Outside interests, election cycles, House of Commons 
                                                 
*    The author gratefully acknowledges invaluable research assistance from Sabrina Korreck and 
Zuzana Murdoch. 1 
 
1. Introduction 
Members of Parliament (MPs) can legally undertake extra-parliamentary activities in many 
countries, and these pursuits are welcomed in many traditions of representation. Yet, they are 
not always looked upon favourably by the mass media and the broader public. Indeed, often 
described as ‘moonlighting’ (Gaggliarducci et al., 2010; Geys and Mause, 2011), they have 
been equated with personal greed, conflicts of interest, neglect of parliamentary duties and 
putting private well-being before the nation (e.g., Noel-Baker, 1961; Carlin, 2007). This 
negative view strengthened during the recent series of scandals on MPs’ expense claims (in 
2009 in the UK and 2011 in the European Parliament) and acceptance of ‘cash for influence’ 
(in 2009 and 2010 in the UK, and 2011 in the European Parliament), ‘cash for questions’ (in 
1994) or ‘cash for honours’ (in 2006-07) (see also Allen, 2008). 
 
Given voters’ ethical concerns regarding politicians’ behaviour (Birch and Allen, 2010; Allen 
and Birch, 2011), this popular association between extra-parliamentary activities and the 
inappropriate use of office may lead such activities to negatively affect politicians’ public 
image. Building on an extensive literature on Political Budget Cycles (i.e., politicians 
introducing popular policy changes prior to elections; for a review, see Franzese 2002), this 
research note argues that such damaging aspect of outside interests makes holding them less 
attractive, certainly when elections are approaching.
1 We test the empirical implications of 
this argument using data from the UK House of Commons’ Register of Members’ Financial 
Interests over the period 2005-2010, thus covering one complete legislative term.  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
A classic argument in political science and economics holds that politicians favour 
implementing politically costly policies – such as tax increases (e.g., Geys and Vermeir, 
2008a, b) – early in the legislative term. When elections are imminent, they rather introduce 
tax reductions (e.g., Mikesell, 1978; Ashworth et al., 2006) or increases in public 
expenditures (e.g., Hicks and Swank, 1992; Sáez and Sinha, 2010). Such Political Budget 
Cycles (PBC) leave incumbents’ popular policy decisions fresh in voters’ minds on Election 
Day, while they have sufficient time to ‘forget’ unpopular measures (for a review, see 
Franzese, 2002).  
 
From a theoretical perspective, such electoral cycles require an instrument, a motive and an 
opportunity (Tufte, 1978; Geys, 2007). The instrument can, in principle, be any policy 
variable available to politicians (Franzese, 2002). The motive is re-election. This need not 
imply, however, that all incumbents will enact policy changes for electoral reasons; electoral 
uncertainty is likely to play an important intermediary role since the more uncertain re-
election is, the stronger is the motive to manipulate public policies (e.g., Frey and Schneider, 
1978; Schultz, 1995). Opportunity, finally, involves two elements: a) knowing when elections 
take place (such that policy changes can be adopted and implemented in time; (Shi and 
Svensson, 2006) and b) having decision-making authority over the ‘instruments’ (Alt and 
Lassen, 2006; Potrafke, 2011). 
 
                                                 
1    Politicians appear to worry about these potential repercussions of outside interests. For instance, David 
Cameron’s attempts to make senior Tory MPs renege on their directorships and outside jobs prior to the May 
2010 election, was motivated by the political damage such interests may cause to the Conservative Party in 
the upcoming election (Watt, 2008). 2 
 
We employ this theoretical framework to address the potential for electoral cycles in 
politicians’ outside interests. As politicians are unlikely to become involved in, or continue 
with, extra-parliamentary activities without their approval, they have full authority over such 
activities (though sometimes allowance should be made for reasonable termination periods). 
Since adjustments of outside activities (i.e., the instrument) should thus be easy (i.e., perfect 
opportunity), the key factor lies in the strength of politicians’ motives for election-driven 
adjustments. We focus on two elements that might affect this motive. 
 
  First, as indicated above, the narrower the vote margin MPs hold over their rivals, the 
more intense the pressure to steer clear of electorally harmful activities. If outside 
interests have detrimental effects on MPs’ public image (see above), electoral 
vulnerability will thus strengthen the incentive to readjust prior to Election Day. Such 
adjustments might, but need not necessarily, reflect the MPs’ wishes. They may also 
derive from partisan pressure. For instance, local party activists influence the selection 
process of candidates (e.g., Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Evans, 2011) and one possible 
manifestation of this influence may well lie in pressure on MPs to give up outside 
interests. 
  Second, extensive evidence suggests that women are, on average, more risk-averse than 
men (Borghans et al., 2008). This also holds among female politicians (e.g., Sjöberg 
and Drottz-Sjöberg, 2008). Translated to our setting, this may lead female MPs to 
perceive or evaluate the political risk (i.e., Election Day retribution) related to outside 
activities differently from male MPs. This, in turn, would imply a different motivation 
across both genders to readjust outside interests prior to Election Day. 
 
This discussion leads to three hypotheses. 
 
H1:  Outside interests decrease prior to elections. 
H2:  This effect is stronger for politicians in a vulnerable electoral position. 
H3:  This effect is stronger for female politicians. 
 
 
3. Institutional Background and Data 
The Code of Conduct for Members of the UK House of Commons states that MPs’ are 
allowed to exercise extra-parliamentary activities when these are entered in the Register of 
Members’ Financial Interests within four weeks of the start of the activity or within a month 
of a politician’s election (House of Commons, 2009). Registration occurs in 12 categories 
ranging from directorships (Category 1) and remunerated employment (Category 2), over 
sponsorships (Category 4) and gifts (Category 5), to land and property (Category 8), 
shareholdings (Category 9) and employment of family members paid from the staffing 
allowance (Category 12). 
 
Our analysis concentrates on Category 1 (i.e., remunerated executive and non-executive 
directorships in private as well as public companies) and Category 2 (i.e., any “employment, 
office, trade, profession or vocation (…) which is remunerated or in which the Member has 
any financial interest”; House of Commons, 2009, 15) since these most directly capture extra-
parliamentary jobs. We extract all entries in these two categories from the Register for the 
period 2005-2010, thus covering one complete legislative term. For each Session within this 
period (a Session usually runs from November to November, unless there is a general 
election), we employ the latest available Register. This enables balancing a need for 3 
 
completeness (by using the latest data available in each Session) and temporal variation (by 
having separate information on Sessions within the legislative period). 
 
We should note here that the rules for registering interests incurred two substantive changes 
during the 2005-2010 period. First, registering employment of family members paid from the 
MP’s staffing allowance (Category 12) is only required since April 2008. Although hiring 
family members could supplant income obtained from extra-parliamentary jobs (a sort of 
‘outsourcing’; Geys and Mause, 2011), it is unlikely that this new publication requirement 
significantly affected extra-parliamentary activities. It is indeed easier to stop paying family 
members from the staffing allowance, and hide their employment from public scrutiny, than 
to replace such income by additional extra-parliamentary activities. Second, in July 2009, the 
financial threshold for registering interests in Categories 1 and 2 was removed (before July 
2009, positions generating income below 1% of the MPs’ salary were exempt from 
registration)
2 and more detailed information became required regarding the “precise amount 
of each individual payment made, the nature of the work (…) [and] the number of hours 
worked” (House of Commons, 2009, 15). This additional information might attract public 
attention and thereby the incentive to have outside interests.
3  We therefore return to its 
potential influence on our findings below. 
 
The data are presented in Figure 1, which portrays the share of MPs with at least one sideline 
activity for each of the five Sessions in the period 2005-2010. As Remunerated employments 
(Category 2) include continuous activities (such as retaining one’s medical practice or writing 
weekly columns in a newspaper) as well as sporadic assignments (such as individual lectures 
or completing a survey), we present these separately. They are referred to as ‘continuous’ and 
‘one-off’, respectively.
4  Figure 1 indicates that the share of MPs holding directorships 
increases until roughly the middle of the legislative term, and then declines. For the share of 
MPs holding Remunerated Employments, we find an increasing trend, which is driven by the 
increase in the number of MPs registering one-off assignments. 
______________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
______________________ 
4. Estimation model 
To evaluate hypotheses H1-H3, we estimate a multiple regression model (with subscript i 
referring to MPs and t to time): 
                                                 
2   The absence of a financial threshold benefits completeness of the Register. Even so, all interests may not be 
registered. Still, ‘hiding’ interests is probably easier for small assignments compared to directorships and 
other long-term interests, such that these data probably are most accurate. Note also that if the abandonment 
of the financial threshold in July 2009 led to the registration of more outside interests, this would stack the 
deck against our hypotheses (since H1 predicts a reduction in outside interests towards elections). 
3   The amount received may help distinguishing between trivial activities and those of potential importance to 
voters. However, this information is only available during the final year of our sample, and thus could not be 
incorporated here. 
4   This is admittedly a crude distinction, and does not account for activities’ relevance to the constituency. 
Interpreted as constituency service, the latter could, however, be seen as part of MPs’ parliamentary tasks, 
rather than outside interests. The Register unfortunately does not readily allow setting apart outside interests 
with constituency relevance, such that our data overestimate true outside interests. Still, assuming MPs are 
not less likely to engage in community service towards the end of the legislative period (which appears 
unlikely), this will bias our results against our central hypotheses. 4 
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We estimate equation (1) using four dependent variables (Yi,t): i.e., Directorships (Category 1 
in the Registry), overall Remunerated employments (Category 2), ‘one-off’ jobs (short-term 
interests in Category 2) and ‘continuous’ jobs (long-term interests in Category 2). Each is a 
dichotomous variable with value 1 when the MP has at least one outside activity within the 
relevant category, and 0 otherwise. Using the actual number of interests in each category, 
however, leads to qualitatively similar findings (available upon request). 
 
Our central explanatory variables – summarized in the vector YEARt – are a set of four year 
dummies equal to 1 in the Session 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2009/10, respectively, and 
0 otherwise (Session 2005/06 acts as reference category).
5 Evidence in line with H1 requires 
significant negative coefficient estimates (j) for years closer to the May 2010 elections. To 
evaluate whether, and how, vote margin and sex affect outside interests over the election 
cycle (H2 and H3), we introduce interaction terms between these year dummies and the MP’s 
vote margin (defined as the percentage difference between his/her vote share in the 2005 
general elections and that of the closest runner-up), and sex (1 for male MPs, 0 for female 
ones). We expect a narrower vote margin and female gender to strengthen election-year 
effects. 
 
Xi,t is a set of control variables (with  a vector of parameters to be estimated) accounting for 
the characteristics of MP’s political mandate (i.e., party affiliation, number of legislative 
periods attended, number of committee memberships), his/her socio-demographic 
characteristics (age, sex, marital status, educational background, occupational background) 
and characteristics of the 2005 election in the MP’s district (i.e., voter turnout, number of 
parties competing and the vote margin between the winner and the runner-up). Note that since 
Zi,t is a subset of Xi,t, all constituent elements of the interaction terms are included in the 
analysis, which is important to obtain unbiased estimates (Brambor et al. 2006). 
 
Finally, given that our dependent variables only take 1/0 values, we employ a logit model to 
estimate equation (1). We account for the non-independence of observations for the same 





Our baseline results – which assess H1 – are provided in Table 1. A quick look at the control 
variables indicates that male MPs are significantly more likely to hold directorships and long-
term remunerated employments than females MPs (supporting evidence from Germany and 
Italy; Becker et al., 2009; Gagliarducci et al., 2010), married MPs are less likely to have 
outside interests, and Conservative Party MPs are more likely to do so. Such partisan effect is 
also observed in Germany (Mause, 2009) and can be “expected on ideological grounds” 
                                                 
5   Modelling the electoral cycle using a quadratic function leads to the same qualitative results. The same holds 
when introducing year dummies only for the last two years in the electoral cycle (details upon request). 
6   As most control variables are constant over time, they would drop out in a fixed-effects estimator. Even so, 
using fixed, rather than random, effects leaves our results unaffected. Also, given the persistence of ancillary 
activities over time, we experimented with modelling the error term as an AR(1) process. This leaves our 
findings qualitatively unaffected (details upon request). 5 
 
(Mancuso, 1995, 67). Finally, MPs with an economic background are more likely to hold 
directorships (corroborating evidence from Italian MPs; Gagliarducci et al., 2010).  
______________________ 
Table 1 about here 
______________________ 
Turning to the vector of year effects, we find that, in line with H1, directorships and long-term 
remunerated employments are scaled back in the years prior to an election. For directorships, 
this occurs in years four and five of the legislative term (after reaching a peak in year 3). For 
long-term remunerated employments, it appears constrained to the 2008/09 Session. However, 
given the way we coded outside interests (i.e., using all information from each entire Session), 
this cannot be due to the change in regulations that came into effect on 1 July 2009 unless 
MPs expected this change at the start of this Session in November 2008 and immediately 
adjusted their behaviour accordingly. As these changes were agreed upon only on 30 April 
2009, this appears unlikely.  
 
Diametrically opposed to this, one-off employments rise sharply in the two years prior to the 
May 2010 election. This is no doubt driven in part by the legislative changes of 2009. Yet, it 
might also indicate that politicians exploit such short-term assignments to increase their 
public visibility ahead of, and during, the electoral race (either by actively seeking out such 
opportunities or by becoming more likely to accept offers provided by media and societal 
groups interested in the electoral race). Alternatively, it could reflect that such one-off jobs 
are used as an insurance policy, job-search activity (i.e., as self-advertising) or money-raising 
opportunity for MPs in fear of being ousted in the upcoming election.  
 
Before going further into to these alternative explanations, let us first look at Figure 2. This 
figure reports results including interaction effects between the year variables and the safety of 
the politicians’ seat (measured via the vote margin over the nearest competitor in the 2005 
elections), which allows evaluating hypothesis H2. Specifically, we depict how the marginal 
effect of the election year dummy (i.e., “Year 5” in Table 1) on the probability of having 
outside interests (our dependent variable) changes over the observed range of MPs’ vote 
margins.
7 The results indicate that MPs’ electoral vulnerability plays an important role. On the 
one hand, MPs in very vulnerable seats (i.e., vote margin≈0) have a significantly lower 
probability of holding directorships (Figure 2a) and continuous employments (Figure 2c) in 
the election year Session (compared to the first Session in the term). This effect weakens 
when the MPs’ seat becomes safer (i.e., moving towards the right-hand side of both figures), 
and disappears when the MPs’ seat is safe enough (it even reverses for continuous 
employments). Hence, only the electorally most vulnerable MPs reduce long-term outside 
interests prior to the election – in line with H2. 
______________________ 
Figure 2 about here 
______________________ 
On the other hand, a safer seat decreases the probability of exercising one-off employments in 
the election year, ceteris paribus. This sheds some light on the unexpected increase in one-off 
jobs closer to the May 2010 election observed above. Indeed, since the July 2009 legislative 
changes are unlikely to affect one-off jobs depending on MPs’ vote margin, this pattern 
                                                 
7   Detailed results for all analyses depicted in Figures 2 through 4 are available upon request. 6 
 
suggests that a reaction to the updated Code of Conduct is not the only effect occurring – and 
that MPs might be exploiting such short-term assignments for increased visibility, insurance 
and/or income (see above). In each case, MPs in marginal constituencies would indeed be 
more prone to exploit the possibilities offered by one-off assignments, generating the pattern 
observed in Figure 2b. 
 
Without probing directly into the politicians’ motivations, it is unfortunately extremely 
difficult to test these various explanations. We can, however, take two tentative steps. First, if 
job-search or money-raising is relevant, this should reflect most strongly in the behaviour of 
MPs who are certain to leave Parliament. Hence, in Figure 3, we report separate results for 
MPs that stood for re-election in the May 2010 elections, and those that did not. We expect 
the latter to care more about job-search/money-raising, which should increase their likelihood 
of having one-off jobs relative to those standing for re-election. Figure 3 shows no significant 
difference between both types of MPs in terms of one-off jobs – suggesting that job-search 
and financial motivations so not appear to strongly steer one-off jobs prior to elections.
8 
Second, one could argue that politicians’ re-election odds should improve when they use one-
off jobs for electoral visibility. Analysing the probability of re-election as a function of having 
one-off jobs (not reported, details upon request), we indeed find a small, positive effect 
(significant at 10% level) for politicians whose vote margin is below 10%. Hence, one-off 
jobs pay off in terms of re-election probability for those politicians making most use of them 
prior to elections (i.e. those with very low vote margins; see Figure 2). Both results together 
provide some preliminary evidence in line with the idea that one-off jobs are used prior to 
elections to boost ones electoral prospects.  
______________________ 
Figure 3 about here 
______________________ 
Finally, Figure 4 summarizes results differentiating between male and female politicians, and 
evaluates hypotheses H3. The results indicate the absence of gender differences. None of the 
male-female differences depicted in Figure 4 approaches statistical significance at 
conventional levels. Hence, the alleged higher risk aversion of women does not appear to 
make them behave differently from male MPs when it concerns the management of outside 
activities over the legislative term (despite the substantial difference in the probability of 
exercising such activities at any point in time; see Table 1). 
______________________ 
Figure 4 about here 
______________________ 
6. Conclusion 
With public perception linking MPs’ outside interests to greed, shirking and conflicts of 
interest, such ancillary activities may become hazardous assets on Election Day. This article 
argued that this may well induce MPs – especially those standing for re-election in marginal 
districts – to re-adjust their outside interests prior to elections. Our analysis, using data from 
                                                 
8  Interestingly, MPs standing for re-election reduce directorships and continuous remunerated employments 
prior to the election, while those not standing for re-election actually increase them. The difference between 
both subsets of politicians is statistically significant at conventional levels especially in years 4 and 5 of the 
legislative term (as indicated by the plus-sign and asterisks in Figure 3). This pattern provides further 
evidence in line with hypothesis H2. 7 
 
the UK House of Commons’ Register of Members’ Financial Interests over the period 2005-
2010, is supportive of such predictions. 
 
Yet, our analysis only scratches the surface of this important topic and further corroboration is 
clearly needed. Indeed, our analysis covers only one electoral term, and an eventful one at 
that. It witnessed several scandals related to MPs’ expenses and outside interests, a leadership 
change in the three main parties, and David Cameron’s public avowal that leading Tories 
would abandon their outside interests. Each may have profoundly affected MPs’ behaviour 
towards outside interests. The pre-electoral adjustments observed in our data could thus have 
been induced by the higher sensitivity of voters and politicians to outside interests in this 
tumultuous legislative period, rather than constitute a general effect. Collecting all required 
data is a painstaking enterprise, but future work should investigate whether our findings hold 
up over a longer time span and different institutional contexts. In our view, the fact that 
variation over the election cycle in MPs’ probability of having outside interests is found to 
depend on the marginality of their seat and whether or not they stand for re-election strongly 
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 Notes:  N=3034; z-values between brackets: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Wald-test indicates 
  joint significance of all regressors (with R the number of regressors minus one). The dependent 























































































































































































































Notes:   N=3034; Figure depicts the marginal effect of the election year dummy (i.e. “Year 5”) over the 
  range of MPs’ vote margin. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for the presence of at 
  least one ancillary position. All controls included as in Table 1. 
a) Directorships 
b) One-off Remunerated Jobs 
c) Continuous Remunerated Jobs 13 
 
Figure 3: Election Cycle as a Function of MPs’ Standing for Re-election 
 
Notes:   N=3034; Figure depicts coefficient estimates of a logistic panel regression model with as 
  dependent variable an indicator variable for the presence of at least one ancillary position. +, *, **, 
  *** denote that coefficient estimates for MPs standing for re-election and MPs not standing for re-
  election are significantly different at 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% level (two-tailed). All controls included 
  as in Table 1. 
 14 
 
Figure 4: Election Cycles as a Function of MPs’ Gender 
 
Notes:  N=3034; Figure depicts coefficient estimates of a logistic panel regression model with as 
  dependent variable an indicator variable for the presence of at least one ancillary position. +, *, **, 
  *** denote that coefficient estimates for male and female MPs are significantly different at 15%, 
  10%, 5% and 1% level (two-tailed). All controls included as in Table 1. 
 
 